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Abstract
Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently usedworking hypothesis in
evolutionary game theory.One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to
follow the strategy choice of themajority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a
conformity-driven strategy update. In this workwe assume that both strategy learningmethods are
present and compete for spacewithin the framework of a coevolutionarymodel. Our results reveal
that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learningmethod becomes exclusive for high sucker’s
payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general,
however, the competition of thementioned strategy learningmethods could be useful to enlarge the
parameter spacewhere only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced
coordination of cooperator players which reveals the beneﬁt of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the
payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against
defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game
region.Ourwork highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the
learningmethod can provide a novel type of pattern formationmechanism that cannot be observed in
a staticmodel, and hence remains hidden in traditionalmodels.
1. Introduction
According to the evolutionary concept of game theory theﬁtness (payoff)of a particular strategy depends on its
frequency in the population [1]. During a selectionmechanism this strategy becomesmore or less popular
depending on its success comparing to other competitor strategies. This protocol canbe implemented easily via a
learning process inwhich a playermay adopt the strategyof a competitor if the latter can reach a higher payoff value
[2–4]. Naturally, this implementation allows us to extend the potential target systems frombiology tomore
complex humanpopulationswhere learning fromothers is an essentialway to buildhighly cooperative societies [5].
Humans, however, are not onlymotivated to reach a higher payoff whenmaking a decisionwho to follow
during an elementary change. For example, conformity is awell-documented and frequently observed attitude
among humans [6, 7]. In the latter case a player prefers to follow the behavior of themajority of neighboring
partners, which is partlymotivated by the fear to avoid too risky individual choice. Notably, conformity also
plays an important role in opinion dynamics [8, 9]. Previousworks already proposed the simultaneous presence
of payoff-driven and conformity-driven strategy learningmethods, but all of them assumed aﬁxed ratio of these
learning protocols and explored how the collective behavior depends on this ratio [10–15].
In the present workwe assume that this ratio isﬂexible andwe allow thementioned learning protocols to
compete for space. This extension has several practicalmotivations. First, it helps us to identify the speciﬁc
conditionswhichmake one of the learning protocols to be exclusive as a result of an evolutionary process.
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Second, such kind of coevolutionarymodel, where not only strategies but also learning attitudes can be
exchanged between players,may offer newways how strategies compete. Indeed, conformity or payoff-driven
learning protocolmay prevail thewhole system at speciﬁc parameter values. Furthermore, in some cases these
strategy learning protocols are not properly competing, but they form a strategy alliance for better evolutionary
outcome. In this way our present observations warrant that the diversity of strategy updating protocols could be
a primemechanism tomaintain cooperation among selﬁsh agents.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. First we proceedwith presenting the details of our
coevolutionarymodel that is followed by the presentation of ourmain results. Finally we discuss their wider
implications and somepotential directions for future research are also given.
2. Coevolution of strategies and learning protocols
For simplicity we study evolutionary social dilemma games on a square grid, but we stress that the key
observations remain valid if we replace square lattice by other interaction graphs, including randomnetworks.
In the beginning each player is designated as cooperator or defector with equal probability and pairwise
interactionswith neighbors are assumed.Heremutual cooperation yields the rewardR, mutual defection leads
to punishmentP, while a cooperator collects a sucker’s payoff S against a defector who enjoys temptation value
T. In agreement with thewidely accepted parametrization of social gamesweﬁxR=1 andP=0, while the
remainingT and S parameters determine the character of the social dilemma [16, 17].More precisely, in case of
T>1 and S>0we consider a snowdrift game, but 0<T<1 and S<0 result in a stag-hunt game situation.
For prisoner’s dilemma gameT>1 and S<0 values are assumed.
Beside thementioned strategies a player also possesses a tag, a personal feature that determines how she
learns a strategy fromothers. In particular, we assume that a player updates strategy either in a payoff-driven or
in a conformity-drivenway. In the former case player x acquires her payoffΠx by playing the particular game
with all her neighbors. Furthermore, player x chooses a neighboring y player randomly who then also acquires
her payoffΠy in a similar way speciﬁed above. After player x adopts the strategy sy fromplayer ywith a
probability
G P - P = + P - P -( ) { [( ) ]} ( )K1 exp , 1x y x y 1
whereK quantiﬁes the uncertainty of strategy adoption.Without loosing generality we useK=0.1 that allows
us to compare our results with previousﬁndings [18]. If player x learns in a conformity-drivenway then she
prefers to adopt the strategy that ismost common in the neighborhood of her interaction range [12].More
precisely, this player adopts the strategy sxwith the probability G - = + - -( ) { [( ) ]}N k N k K1 exps h s h 1x x ,
where Nsx is the number of players who represent sxwithin the interaction range of focal player x, whereas kh is
one half of the degree of player x. As previously, hereK determines the uncertainty of learning process, which
makes also possible the adoption of the strategy of theminority with a small probability. For simplicity we used
the same noise value as for the pairwise imitation step. In the beginning, similarly to the strategy distribution,
each player is designated as a learner using payoff-driven (p) or conformity-driven (o)motivationwith equal
probability.
Technically itmeans thatwe have a four-state systemwhere a player is payoff-driven cooperator (pC), payoff-
driven defector (pD), conformity-driven cooperator (oC), or conformity-driven defector (oD). The key feature of
our coevolutionarymodel is that playersmay adopt not only strategies from aneighbor, but also theway of
learning. This adoption fromplayer y for player x happenswith the probability deﬁned by equation (1). In an
elementaryMonte Carlo step (MCS) a player is selected for a strategy adoption and independently for changing
the learningmethod. These adoptions happenwith the probabilities deﬁned above. In a system containingN
players a fullMCS consists ofN elementary steps, hence on average all players have a chance to change strategy
and/or learningmethod. All simulation results are obtained on interaction graphs typically comprising
= ´ ´–N 2 10 8 105 6 nodeswhere the stationary fractions of different states are averaged after 105–106MCSs
of relaxation. Theﬁnal results are averaged over 100 independent realizations for each set of parameter values.
3. Results
Weﬁrst present results obtained for the snowdrift game quadrant ofT–S planewhereT>1 and S>0. The
ﬁnal outcome of the coevolutionary process for different (T, S)parameter pairs is summarized in the phase
diagramplotted inﬁgure 1. This diagramhighlights that the region of full cooperator state is extended
dramatically comparing to the basicmodel where players adopt external strategy only in a payoff-drivenway.
For comparison the border of full cooperator phase for the latter case ismarked by dotted green line in the
diagram. This comparison underlines that the application of a coevolutionary rule in the updating protocol can
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enhance the kingdomof cooperation even for snowdrift gamewhere it was impossible to detect cooperation
promotingmechanism in the framework of the traditionalmodel [19].
Turning back to the diagram, ifT and/or S are too high then payoff-driven strategy learning protocol
becomes exclusive and the system evolves into a state where pC and pD coexist in a role-separatingway that
provides optimal total payoff for the population [20]. Interestingly, there is an island in the parameter space
where all the available states can survive and form a stable solution. This region is denoted by ‘mixed’ label in the
diagram. As expected, if S is too small andT is too high then both types of cooperators die out and only defectors
survive.
For amore quantitative descriptionwe present two characteristic cross sections of the diagram inﬁgure 2. In
the left panel weﬁxed S=0.7 and increased the temptation value gradually. At smallT values both types of
defectors die out soon and only pC and oCplayers survive. Here the system always evolves into a homogeneous
state in the long run, but the likelihood to reach a homogeneous pC or a homogeneous oC state depends on the
initial fractions of these players when neutral coarsening starts [21]. Consequently, the plotted fractions of oC
and pC players in the early fullC region show simply the probability to reach the related homogeneous oC and pC
states. Aswe increaseT the four-statemixed solution emerges, followed by a full cooperator state again, and
ﬁnally the coexistence of pC and pD players becomes stable at highT values.While the emergence and decline of
Figure 1. FullT–S phase diagramof snowdrift gamewhere payoff-driven and conformity-driven strategy learning protocols are
competing for space. Red solid lines denote continuous phase transitions, while blue dashed line denotes ﬁrst-order phase transition.
FullC (fullD) labelmarks the parameter regions where only cooperator (defector) strategies survive in the stationary state. ‘Payoff-
driven’ labelmarks the regionwhere payoff-driven strategy learning protocol prevails and related cooperator and defector players
form a stable winning solution. The phase denoted by ‘mixed’ label showswhere all learning protocols and all strategies coexist. For
comparison, green dotted linemarks the border of full cooperator state when only payoff-driven learning protocol is available for
players in a uniform system.
Figure 2.Representative cross sections of the snowdrift phase diagram shown inﬁgure 1, as obtained for S=0.7 (left panel) and for
T=1.5 (right panel). Depicted are stationary fractions of four states dependent on temptationT (left) and sucker’s payoff S (right).
Stable solutions are denoted along the top axis. Further description of emerging phase transitions can be found in themain text.
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themixed solution happens via a continuous phase transition the change from a fullC state to a payoff-driven
solution is always discontinuous.
In the right panel ofﬁgure 2weﬁxedT=1.5 and increased the sucker’s payoff gradually. At small S values
cooperator players die out very soon and only pD and oD players survive. Similarly to the fullC state here the
system always evolves into a homogeneous pD or a homogeneous oD state via a slow coarsening. Accordingly, the
plotted fractions of pD and oD denote only the probability to reach the related homogeneous states. By increasing
S the stable coexistence of payoff-driven players emerges, which is replaced by the full dominance of oC players.
This transition is always discontinuous. Higher S offers a chance for all kind of players to survive that is followed
by the dominance of payoff-driven learning protocol at very high S values.
To get a deeper insight about the pattern formations which resulted in the above described evolutionary
outcomeswe present a representative evolution of spatially distributed players inﬁgure 3.Herewe do not use the
traditional random initial distribution of availablemicroscopic states, but apply a specially prepared patch-like
state where all kind of interfaces between competing players can be found. In this waywe canmonitor all
emerging pattern formations simultaneously via a single run. The starting state, where all borders areﬂat
between homogeneous patches, is not shown, but panel(a) ofﬁgure 3 shows an early stage of evolutionary
process. This panel illustrates nicely that the ﬂat border between oD and oC remains practically frozen, as it is
highlighted by awhite ellipse andmarked by ‘1’, because both strategies support their akin players at the front by
ensuring themajority of similar strategies around them. Similarly, the border between oD and pD domains,
denoted by ellipse ‘2’ and the border between oC and pC players (ellipse ‘3’) do not really propagate, but just
ﬂuctuate due to a neutral voter-model like slow coarsening. Alternatively, the interface between pC and pD
domains,marked by ellipse ‘4’, starts diffusing intensively yielding a stable coexistence between these players.
Note that in a two-player subsystem, which is identical to the traditional payoff-driven uniform system, these
players would coexist at theseT–S values.
Interestingly, new states emerge at the front between pD and oC domain, whichwere not initially present. On
one hand pD adopts the conformity attitude from oC because the latter reaches higher payoff and becomes oD,
shownby ellipse ‘5’. On the other hand, pDmay adopt the strategy of oC and becomes pC, as it is illustrated by
ellipse ‘6’. However, due to the neutral relation between defector states the emerging oD cannot spread in the
bulk of pD, but stick at the original border of oC and pD , as it is shown by ellipse ‘7’ in panel(b) ofﬁgure 3.
Noteworthy, pD players can enter into the bulk of pC players and build up a stable coexistence, as shownby ellipse
Figure 3. Spatial evolution of the four competing states in a 400×400 system atT=1.4 and S=0.4where the simulation is
launched from a prepared patch-like initial statewhere all states are distributed in homogeneous domains (not shown). Here dark
(light) blue denotes payoff-driven (conformity-driven) cooperators, while dark (light) redmarks payoff-driven (conformity-driven)
defectors, as it ismarked bywhite labels in panel(a). This panel represents the early stage of evolutionary process after 20MCSs.
Further stages of the evolutionary process are shown at 50, 150, 250, 350, and 800MCSs. Finally the system evolves into a
homogeneous oC state (not shown). The details of representative pattern formation processes are described in themain text.
4
New J. Phys. 20 (2018) 093008 A Szolnoki andXChen
‘8’ in panel(b). In this way the original border between pD and oC serves as a source of emerging pC+pD
solutionwhich invades the pure pD domain—this is nicely demonstrated by ellipse ‘9’ in panel(c).
Similarly to the above discussed case, themissing twomicroscopic states can also emerge at the original
border of pC and oD domains. First, pC cannot reach really high payoff at the border, but oD is less vulnerable no
matter her lowpayoff because she learns in a conformity-drivenway. As a result, pCmay change to pD state by
learning the strategy of oD, as highlighted by ellipse ‘10’ in panel(a). After, as described previously, the emerging
pD state can form a viable coexistence with pC players, hence the pC+pD solution starts forming again. This is
illustrated by ellipse ‘11’ in panel (c). Speaking about the fourth state, oC can also emerge at the original border of
oD and pC because theﬂuctuating and highly disordered bordermay allow oD players to follow the strategy of pC
and become oC. This process ismarked by ellipse ‘12’ in panel(a).While the latter state remains viable, but its
spread into the bulk of the pD+pC solution ismuch slower than the propagation of pC+pD solution in the
original dark blue domain. (The slow growth of oCphase in pC+ pD solution ismarked by ellipse ‘13’ in
panels(b)–(e)).
Summing up our observations, in the snowdrift quadrant practically the pC+pD solutionﬁghts against the
oC state. This is nicely demonstrated in panel(e) of ﬁgure 3, where both solutions have alreadywon their local
battles and only these solutions survive toﬁght further for theﬁnal triumph. Since oC players follow conformity-
biased learning protocol the enforced homogeneity of cooperation provides a highly competitive payoff that
could be attractive for payoff-driven competitors. As a result, they become conformist easily. Contrarily,
homogeneous oD domain cannot offer high payoff for payoff-driven players and the latter group stays at their
original learning protocol. In this way the coevolution of payoff-driven and conformity-driven protocols can
break the original symmetry of conformity-driven strategies, where both uniformdestinations are possible, and
pave theway for a full cooperator state that would be unreachable for the traditionalmodel of uniform payoff-
driven dynamics at such a high temptation value. (Theﬁnal evolutionary outcome, which is a homogeneous oC
state, is not shown in our ﬁgure, but can bemonitored in the animation provided in [22]).
Our argument thatmakes clear the broader appearance of full cooperator state can also explainwhy payoff-
driven solution becomes dominant for high S and/or highT values. In the latter cases the collective payoff of
role-separating pC+pD coexistence can reach the competitive payoff of oC domains. Consequently payoff-
driven players can survive and they become dominant aswe increaseT or S further. The latter is illustrated in
ﬁgure 4, wherewe plotted three representative snapshots of the stationary state for three different S values where
allmicroscopic states are present in the ‘mixed’ phase. These plots highlight that the pC+pD solution gradually
crowd out oC state aswe increase S and becomes exclusive above a critical value of S. Notably, as we already
discussed above, the interface between oC and pC+pD domains offers a chance for oD state to emergewhich
explains the presence of all availablemicroscopic states in the ‘mixed’ phase. Last, we note that similar behavior
can also be reached atﬁxed S by increasingT only, because the competitive payoff for pC+pD solution can be
ensured in the latter way, too.
Turning to the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant ofT–S plane, the application of our coevolutionarymodel
cannot yield notably different results from the classical casewhen players apply payoff-driven learningmethod
uniformly [16].More precisely, both oC and pC players die out soon after we launch the evolution from a random
initial state and only defectors survive. In otherwords, deep in the prisoner’s dilemmaquadrant whenT>1 and
S<0 the coevolution of different learningmethods cannot yield additional help for cooperators to survive.
Figure 4. Stationary distribution of differentmicroscopic states obtained atT=1.5 for S=0.65, 0.75 and 0.82 from left to right. The
color coding of differentmicroscopic states are identical to those applied inﬁgure 3.Namely, dark (light) blue denotes payoff-driven
(conformity-driven) cooperators, while dark (light) redmarks payoff-driven (conformity-driven) defectors. The pC+pD domains
becomemore andmore dominant aswe increase S and above a threshold value this solution prevails in thewhole space. Similar
behaviormay be detected atﬁxed S aswe gradually increase the value ofT. Linear system size is L=400.
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The evolutionary outcome, however, ismore interesting in the stag-hunt quadrant whereT<1 and S<0.
Here in the classic case either defectors or cooperators prevail depending on the actualT–S values [20]. This
evolutionary outcome remains valid for the present coevolutionarymodel, but now cooperators can dominate
larger parameter areas fromdefectors. This is illustrated inﬁgure 5where the full cooperator and full defector
states are separated by a discontinuous phase transition. For comparisonwe have also plotted the same border
line in the case when only payoff-driven strategy learning is used by the players. The comparison suggests that in
the coevolutionary case there is a signiﬁcant area ofT–S planewhere the direction of the evolutionary process
can be reversed and a full cooperator state is reached instead of full defection destination.
To understand the origin of this remarkably different outcomewe present a series of snapshots of
evolution starting from a prepared initial state atT=0.89 and S=−0.3. In the initial state, shown in
panel(a) of ﬁgure 6, players using payoff-driven learningmethod are distributed randomly in the left side of
the space while players using conformity-driven strategy learningmethod are distributed on the right side.
The early stage after the evolution is launched can be seen in panel(b). It suggests that pD players can easily
beat pC players and the ﬁnal outcome of this subsystemwould be a full defector state. (The last surviving dark
blue domain of pC players in the sea of dark red pD players goes extinct in panel (d).)Notably, the evolution in
the right side is different because the strategy-neutral conformity-drivenmicroscopic rule would allow both
destinations of uniform states. In this subsystem the curvature-driven coarsening determines how domains
become larger and larger by eliminating the peaks and bulges from the interfaces separating homogeneous oC
and oD domains. Consequently, small islands are always shrinking in the bulk of a larger domain. Only straight
frontiersmay be stable temporarily but their edges, where the curvature is relevant, are also unstable. The
vicinity of payoff-driven players, however, breaks the original symmetry of oC and oD states. Since payoff-
driven players aremostly defectors, neighboring conformity-driven players will also prefer defector strategy.
As a result, light-blue oC domains would gradually disappear and defection seems to be a victor in both sub-
systems.
Interestingly, however, themixture of oC and pC players (light and dark blue) can form an effective alliance
against defectors.While oC, surrounded by other cooperators, is less vulnerable against pD players, pC can also
utilize that oD players need a regular interface for invasion. In the absence of it the latter becomes also susceptible
to the vicinity of pC players. These two effects altogether establish an effective alliance of different types of
cooperator strategies, who can gradually prevail in thewhole system (theﬁnal destination to a full cooperator
state is not shown inﬁgure 6, but can bemonitored in the animation provided in [23]). It is worth noting that the
mixture of oD and pD players cannot form similar effective alliance because pD state cannot utilize the vicinity of
oD players.
4.Discussion
In this workwe have studied the coevolution of competing strategies and their learningmethods. Beside the
broadly applied payoff-driven imitation dynamics we have also assumed players to use conformity-driven
Figure 5. FullT–S phase diagramof stag-hunt gamewhere payoff-driven and conformity-driven strategy learning collaborate to beat
defectors. Dashed blue line shows the border of full cooperator and full defector phases. For comparison the dotted green line shows
the same border for the classicmodel when only payoff-driven strategy learning is used.
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learning and allowed them to change their learning protocols in time. The proper coevolution revealed
signiﬁcantly different behaviors from those cases whenwe just apply thementioned learningmethods
simultaneously in a static way via an external control parameter. In the latter cases players can only vary their
strategies during the evolution [15, 24–26]. In otherwords, the signiﬁcance of present study is to reveal the
qualitatively different pattern formationmechanisms thatwe can only observe in a coevolutionary framework.
We have shown that there are parameter regions, like strong snowdrift game situations at highT or high S
valueswhere the competition of different learningmethods results in the unambiguous victor of payoff-driven
strategy learning. Here the role separating cooperator-defector pairs provide so high collective payoff value that
cannot be beaten by a homogeneous domainwhichwould be a consequence of a conformity-driven learning
method.Nevertheless, for less sharp snowdrift game regions at smallerT and S values the coevolution of
different learningmethods is useful to reach a full cooperative state that would not be reachable otherwise. In the
latter case the homogeneous cooperator domains can invade thewhole space by enjoying the advantage of
conformity-driven learningmethod.
Interestingly, in the stag-hunt game region the simultaneous presence of different learningmethods reveals a
novel way of collaboration that cannot be observed otherwise.Here conformity-driven cooperators can resist
the invasion of payoff-driven defectors and neighboring payoff-driven cooperators can attack conformity-
driven defectors successfully. The expected symmetry is broken for defectors because oD and pD states cannot
form similarly efﬁcient alliance. In this way the active partnership of different types of cooperator players allows
them to extend the full cooperator state to those parameter values which belonged to the sovereignty of defectors
in the classic payoff-drivenmodel.
The diversity of players has already been proved to be useful tomaintain cooperation in harsh environment
where defectionwould prevail in a homogeneous population [27–37]. Our present observations underline that
this concept can be extendedmore generally in a coevolutionary framework [17, 38–41]where the evolution
either select one of the learningmethods to prevail or allows coexistence by offering new solutions to emerge.
Hopefully our extention can be useful for other kind ofmicroscopic rules, includingwin-stay lose-shift,myopic,
other-regarding preference, Pavlov-rule, or in general for those rules which use a sort of aspiration level for
personal decisionmaking [42–54].
Figure 6. Spatial evolution starting from a random initial statewhere players are separated according to their learningmethods. The
color code of different states are identical to the case we used inﬁgure 3. In panel(a) the 400×400 system is divided into two halves,
where the left side is occupied by payoff-driven players while the right side is occupied by conformity-driven players. First, red color
defectors seem to dominate, but after thewinning oC+pC (mixture of light and dark blue colors) alliance emerges in panel(d) and
the direction of evolution is reversed. Finally the system terminates onto a fullC state (not shown) that is unreachable for classicmodel
at the appliedT=0.89, and S=−0.3 parameter pair. The different stages of the evolutionary process are shown at 20, 600, 2100,
5500, and 11500MCSs, respectively. Further details of emerging pattern formation are given in themain text.
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